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Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017

ISSN: 1948-352X

**Journal for Critical Animal Studies**

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**Issue Introduction**

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*Keywords:*shame, SPCA, animal abuse, activism, nonhuman animals

**Issue Introduction**

Every November, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) publishes their ‘List of Shame’ which highlights the worst, most shameful animal abuse cases on record that year. The stories that top this year’s list include a puppy who suffered 11 fractures and massive swelling to her face from a brutal beating by her owner, a church operator, and a Labrador who was tied up by a metal chain and left neglected, outdoors in the elements for weeks on end. The SPCA releases this list ahead of their most prominent fundraising event, the Annual Appeal, with the aims of raising awareness of and preventing cruelty to animals (Newshub, 2017). Also, on this list include several commercial breeders who profit from mass producing animals in so-called ‘puppy mills’ to turn a profit. The canine featured on this issue, a great Dane named Sue, was rescued from a for-profit commercial breeder who inbreeds a line of Great Danes that are genetically presupposed to develop glaucoma which causes excruciating eye pain. In Sue’s case, he’s had both of his eyes removed. Sue was one of the lucky ones who escaped, while other pups may not be so lucky. Many puppies that develop debilitating conditions are much more likely to be abused and abandoned as ‘damaged goods.’ And while this breeder, Iowa Fox Creek Kennels, is professionally USDA licensed and AKC-registered to sell dogs for profit, most would still find these practices inhumane. The standards of care for these dogs as required by the USDA are woefully inadequate. For instance, it’s perfectly legal to keep dogs in cramped cages, stacked on top of each other, and to breed female dogs repeatedly until they are dead. These types of breeding operations where profit is prioritized over well-being, and dogs are treated like products, not living, breathing beings is shameful (ASPCA, 2017).

The goal in presenting such horrific instances of shame, whether they highlight human or nonhuman abuse, is to generate an emotional reaction that ultimately prompts people to act. Shame is an intricate human emotion that can profoundly shape our perspective and actions. When explored within the complex relationship that humans have with animals, emotional responses such as shame provide an excellent starting point for understanding and then transforming systems of oppression.

In this issue, the essay “Salvaging Shame, Saving Ourselves: The Productive Role of Shame for Animals and Marginalized Life” by Brianne Donaldson and Isaac Willis brings together many discourses about shame with a new critical animal studies perspective. Various famous theorists such as Karl Marx, Emmanuel Levinas, John Paul Sartre, Franz Kafka, Georgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Carol Adams, Judith Butler, Pope Francis, Barry Lopez, Alice Walker, and Walt Whitman, among others have discussed shame with regard to nonhuman animals. The sheer number of theorists who mention their shame regarding nonhuman animals is overwhelming and telling. Their perspectives reveal details about oppressive societal values and concepts that need to change to produce nonhuman liberation.

It presents an invaluable assessment of how humans often live in the shadow of shame regarding their treatment of nonhuman animals. The essay identifies an approach to shame that can be productively deployed in diverse contexts and communities. Rituals are cited as a valuable vehicle upon which humans can transform habits into action toward liberating animals and marginalized others. Insofar as a productive reading of shame can be used to create secular and religious rituals, they build upon Donaldson’s previous work (Donaldson, 2015) that challenges the secular/religious split that has characterized much of animal rights and critical animal studies over the past decades. By drawing upon diverse sources such as literature, political theory, and multiple philosophical threads, they show how thematic approaches—considering shame, in this case—can create coalitions and common cause across disparate boundaries, instigated by marginalized animals, plants, and people. They offer innovative tools for thought and action that can be utilized by any reader, in any context.

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**Salvaging Shame, Saving Ourselves: The Productive Role of Shame for Animals and Marginalized Life**

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**Abstract**

In this essay, we explore the etymological diversity of the concept of shame and ask whether a particular experience of shame can play a productive role in creating new rituals that recognize previously excluded individuals such as more-than-human animals, as well as marginalized plants and people. Rather than employ a specific methodology, we draw upon (1) diverse sources that theorize shame across disciplinary and cultural boundaries and (2) another group of sources who have explored various secular and religious rituals of re-membering. Starting with novelist Jonathan Safran Foer, for example, we identify a specific reading of shame as a nag of memory. We trace that nag of memory through the two groups named above—represented variously by Karl Marx, Emmanuel Levinas, John Paul Sartre, Franz Kafka, Georgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Carol Adams, Judith Butler, Pope Francis, Barry Lopez, Alice Walker, and Walt Whitman, among others—highlighting productive linkages between shame and ritual. We assert that freeing a particular kind of shame within ourselves and our communities may awaken new personal and public rituals that promise to re-include forgotten lives, especially more-than-human animals, currently excluded from the bonds of mutual response, attention, and care.

*Keywords*: shame, guilt, rituals, plants, animals, marginalized people

Salvaging Shame, Saving Ourselves:

The Productive Role of Shame for Animals and Marginalized Life

Shame, like so many words in the English language, obscures more than it clarifies. In one instance, the simple accusation “Shame on you” functions almost as a magical incantation meant to startle awake the slumbering monster of internal or external judgment after we have crossed some line of social expectation. In another case, “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me,” is a reflective utterance more akin to embarrassment. One can feel shame or one can be shamed, with all manner of shades between the two. The same term can be deployed when articulating a moment of cringe-worthy clumsiness, as well as to justify community expulsion, the violation of social norms, or to explain a state of debilitating psychological trauma.

In addition to exploring this etymological diversity, the question we ask in this article is whether a specific experience of shame can play a productive role in creating new rituals that recognize excluded individuals such as so-called animals, as well as marginalized plants and people. The aim of these rituals, whether sacred or secular, is to re-member—to literally renew membership or communion with—lives previously excluded from our communities of moral concern and world-shaping collaboration. Rather than employ a specific methodology, we draw upon (1) diverse sources that theorize shame across disciplinary and cultural boundaries and (2) another group who have explored various secular and religious rituals of re-membering. Starting with novelist Jonathan Safran Foer, for example, we identify a particular reading of shame as a nag of memory that we trace through both groups, represented variously by Karl Marx, Emmanuel Levinas, John Paul Sartre, Franz Kafka, Georgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Carol Adams, Judith Butler, Pope Francis, Barry Lopez, Alice Walker, and Walt Whitman, among others, in order to consider productive linkages between shame and ritual.

Freeing a particular kind of shame within ourselves and our communities, we assert, may awaken new personal and public rituals of feeling with forgotten lives that widen the boundaries of who is within or excluded from the bonds of mutual response, attention, and care.

**A Ritual of Repentance**

In the dimly lit basement of the Jain Society of Metropolitan Chicago in September 2016, two hundred children, teenagers, and young professionals sat down upon the floor slowly, careful not to squash any insects. The gesture was mostly ceremonial, as the meticulously clean and modern educational hall seemed largely bug-free, even as it had been transformed for the night into a ritualized space of repentance toward neglected life forms.

Jainism is an ancient Indian tradition centered on the principle and practice of *ahiṃsā*, meaning the negation of *hiṃsā*, or literally the absence of a strong desire to hit or strike—nonviolence basically—in thought, speech, and action toward all life forms. This includes people, plants, animals, and even elemental organisms living in air, earth, fire, and water. While it is easy to dismiss this ethical ideal as impossible, Jains believe that awareness, attention, and apology are the first steps toward minimizing their impact.

These second- and third-generation Jains in Chicago were celebrating the annual ritual of *pratikramaṇa*, meaning to “turn back” and consider any harmful thoughts or actions of the past year. The final pratikramaṇa recitation of this 8-10 day festival is an extended litany of repentance. A few of the guests tentatively hold a small hand broom, typically used by the monks and nuns of the Jain tradition, to sweep the ground clear of bugs and microscopic life. Most hold a white cloth in their right hand, called a *muhpatī*, to cover their mouth when speaking—emulating another monastic practice—to be mindful of their breath and damaging speech. Taking care when sitting serves as a reminder that daily actions, however simple, can negatively affect other life forms; and in causing harm to others within a karmically bound system, we harm ourselves.

The two-hour basement prayer was mostly in English, the first language for most of these Jains, punctuated by short communal verses in Prākrit and Sanskrit. One floor above, approximately 1,300 more Jains—men packed into one hall, women crowded into another—recite the full three-hour prayer in its original languages. Upwards of 3,000 community members recited the pratikramaṇaprayer throughout the final day of celebration.

The ritual of turning back is remarkably expansive, enumerating the 8.4 million kinds of life forms described in ancient Jain texts in hopes that by knowing them better, we might act differently. The recitation leader articulates very specific violations such as not inspecting the floor before setting a heavy object down and killing living beings, eating food prepared cruelly, needlessly confining animals and birds, working in jobs that uproot plants and pollute the environment, among many other possible faults.

To conclude the ritual on behalf of the group, the leader reads aloud a three-fold apology that stems from some of the earliest strata of Jain texts. This confession expands *hiṃsā* to the realm of thought, word and deed, as well as direct, indirect, or systemic violence: “If I have committed any of the above lapses mentally, verbally, or physically (*kṛta*); have asked others to commit them (*kārita*), or have praised those who commit them (*anumata*), I repent and ask for forgiveness. I pray that my faults be dissolved.” The voices affirm in unison “*micchāme dukkaḍam*,” meaning roughly, “May my missteps be without effect.” [[3]](#footnote-3)

This ritual offers a personal and communal way to think with one another and with the marginalized life left out of our narrowly human-centric politics of who counts. Repenting here goes beyond mere ritualized apology, and functions as a primary mode of *recognizing* neglected life and consequently re-membering those lives whom are difficult to see at all—much less care about or grieve for—as part of our moral communities of concern. Repentance as recognition can lead to a re-membering of our planetary multiplicity.

**The Many Shades of Shame**

In his book, *Eating Animals* (2010), Jonathan Safran Foer provides various first-hand and farmer accounts of animal suffering among what feminist-vegan scholar Carol Adams (2006) calls “terminal animals,” meaning the 95% of all animal bodies whose birth and short life is merely to provide eggs, milk, or flesh to human consumers (p. 591). Foer’s account of an individual cow, for example, still conscious after being stunned, hanging from the shackles, as a kill floor worker cuts its legs off with a mechanized clipper, is so visceral that it nauseates the gut and immobilizes the mind. Foer’s data-driven, but personal, storytelling sears onto the heart with the cruelty of a cattle brand, marking us as incriminated, caught in the chute, captured and speechless.

Foer (2010) suggests that one of the primary ingredients in undermining socially sanctioned violence toward animals in the food system is shame, which he describes as the “core experience of the ethical” (p. 36). Like Jacques Derrida standing naked before his cat or Franz Kafka’s gazing upon fish in the Berlin aquarium, on which more is to come, shame describes—in part—the unique experience of being seen or perceived by an ‘Other’ who had almost been forgotten as part of our community of concern. This particular experience of shame has two parts: first, experiencing oneself as *seen*, and second, seen *by one previously deemed incapable of seeing.* To be sure, this is not the only way of understanding shame, a term that implies significant variation.

For instance, in her book, *Is Shame Necessary?*, Jennifer Jacquet (2015) tries to parse the narrow distinction between shame and guilt. Guilt, according to Jacquet, is “a feeling whose audience and instigator is oneself, and its discomfort leads to self-regulation” (p. 4). In this sense, guilt is an individualized feeling of failing at one’s internal expectations (p. 11). Shame, or more precisely, being shamed, is rooted in public exposure that “links shame to reputation” (p. 9). An audience is needed to perceive one’s actions in order to feel shame. Here again, Jacquet attempts to differentiate shaming-as-exposure with the personal emotion of shame. Indeed, she argues, the emotion of shame can lead to “stress and a withdrawal from society” that can be extremely self-harming, whereas “the threat of shaming often provokes a fear of feeling shame” (p. 10). Public shaming, it seems, is the warning shot that one must heed to avoid the more insidious feeling of personal shame.

This idea of anticipatory shame resonates with Aristotle’s concept of the Greek *aishkunê*, described by David Konstan (2003) as an “inhibitory emotion based on sensitivity to and protectiveness of one’s self-image” (p. 1035). Akin to Jaquet’s reading, *aishkunê* involves the sense of impending shame, “a pain or disturbance concerning those ills, either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace, while shamelessness is a disregard or impassivity concerning these same things” (p. 1040). This version of shame includes remembering past events, sensing present events, or anticipating future events that might bring about a “loss of reputation or disgrace” (p. 1040). *Aishkunê* is not shame felt *in response to* “ill repute or disgrace . . . but rather [a response] to those ills *that leads to* [ill repute or disgrace]” (p. 1042; emphasis added).

Jacquet suggests that personal guilt is more prevalent than public shame in the west, due to an emphasis on individualism such that communal shaming has become increasingly stigmatized in countries such as the United States. With a general distaste for singling out individuals for public ridicule in western cultures, shaming, suggests Jacquet (2015), has been “supplanted by the self-punishment of guilt” (p. 28).

But this personal guilt/public shame contrast is easily muddled. Some scholars identify shame as a private phenomenon. Confucian religious studies scholar Jane Geaney (2004), for instance, describes shame as an “*internalization* of social moral codes” (p. 113; emphasis original) grounded solely in “one’s consciousness” without the need for an external judge (p. 127). Another scholar claims that shame leads one to a place of concealment, while guilt leads to action (Gilbert, 2003, p. 1206). And still, for another, shame is a product of having felt guilt that can only be brought about by self-love and love for others (Gilligan, 2003, p. 1154).

The definition is further obscured by psychoanalytic philosopher Amanda Holmes (2015), who argues that shame is both social *and* isolating, such that private shame must be confessed publicly if it is to be ultimately resolved (p. 415). We suspect that the difficulty in clarifying exactly what shame is, and its possible difference from guilt, may be that there is considerable variation in what people feel personal shame about, how it is experienced subjectively, and how these responses overlap with internal and external standards.

**The Possibility of Productive Shame**

In terms of crafting rituals that productively allow one to feel shame, we follow Foer’s (2010) description that shame “is the work of memory against forgetting” (p. 37). But forgetting what? Foer’s realization came while taking his young son on visits to the Berlin aquarium. While staring in at the floating seahorses, Foer recalled his writing hero Franz Kafka’s reflections on the aquarium after having become vegetarian. “As a writer aware of that Kafka story,” Foer writes, “I came to feel a certain kind of shame at the aquarium” (p. 40). Part of that shame came in forgetting aquatic animals’ similarity to himself: “We can recognize parts of ourselves in fish” such as “spines, nociceptors, endorphins, all of the familiar pain responses—but then deny that these animal similarities matter, and thus equally deny important parts of our humanity. What we forget about animals we begin to forget about ourselves” (p. 37). It is the nag of memory that Foer struggles to narrate, a nag that recalls some social bondedness that has not, and perhaps cannot, fully disappear.  “Shame,” writes Foer, “is what we feel when we almost entirely—yet not entirely—forget our social expectations and our obligations to others in favor of immediate gratification” (p. 37).

This nag can surface when we pass a homeless person, for example. When we watch video footage of drone bombings across the globe, we may feel that nag that the other is not entirely Other. Even in our own daily routines of biting into a chicken nugget or cutting through a steak, we might be nagged by a dim awareness of what Carol Adams (2000) calls the “absent referent” (p. 14). She writes:

Behind every meal of meat is an absence: the death of the animal whose place the meat takes. The ‘absent referent’ is that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the absent referent is to keep our ‘meat’ separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal, to keep the ‘moo’ or ‘cluck’ or ‘baa’ away from the meat, to keep some*thing* from being seen as having been some*one*. (p. 14; emphasis original)

Alice Walker (1992) describes the barbs of this persistent memory poignantly in her essay “Am I Blue?” after observing the lonely boredom of a neighbor’s horse and his expressions of desire for apples and company conveyed in a whinny, snort, or stamp. “I had forgotten,” she writes, “the depth of feeling one could see in horses’ eyes” (p. 139). She continues:

I had forgotten that human animals and nonhuman animals can communicate quite well; if we are brought up around animals as children we take this for granted. By the time we are adults we no longer remember. However, the animals have not changed. They are in fact completed creations (at least they seem to be, so much more than we) who are not likely to change; it is their nature to express themselves. What else are they going to express? And they do. And, generally speaking, they are ignored. (p. 139)

Walker compares this forgetting with the social amnesia of white children raised by black mammies whose formative love and nurturance they were made to forget when those same women were sold to other families or when children grew to adults whose identities hung on being different from, and dominant to, “negroes” (p. 139).

Being confronted by an Other, who reminds us of our forgetfulness—who instigates the shame of fading memory—can be disorienting. John Paul Sartre (1965) describes this reflective feeling as “a shameful apprehension *of* something and this something is *me*. I am ashamed of what I *am*. Shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself” (p. 188; emphasis original). While his version of shame is at once internalized as a “mode of consciousness,” (p. 188) Sartre takes pains to point out that “shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection” but must be felt “*before somebody*” (p. 188; emphasis original) in what he calls “the Look” (p. 188). Although there is an interior dimension, productive shame is felt in the face of another. It is felt, as in the case of Foer, while staring in at seahorses.

Of course, for much of European and Western philosophy, including Sartre, this face could only belong to the human. Even Emmanual Levinas (1989), who compellingly described how “the face before me summons me, calls for me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must be faced by the Other . . . were my business” (p. 83), did not extend the face, which he defined as the foundation of the ethical encounter, beyond the so-called human. This human-centric inheritance has persisted in deconstructive thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler. Each helpfully rejected fixed notions of a subject always present to experience passed on from the likes of Heidegger and Husserl. Instead, they opted for a subject that is always Other even to itself, always changing and escaping the confines of language and identity categories, even as they failed to extend this methodology toward the boundaries of species systematically. But such shortcomings are the tasks for those who come after, and many critical animal theorists, myself included, have mined the pages of these thinkers for the very tools needed to push their methods beyond the register of the human (Donaldson, 2015, pp. 17-25; Donaldson and Sinclair, 2011).

“The Look,” after all, transforms. As Walt Whitman (1982 [1855]) poetically expressed, “Oxen that rattle the yoke or halt in the shade, what is that you express in your eyes? / It seems to me more than all the print I have read in my life” (p. 37). In his later work, too, Derrida was undone by the stare of his cat. Foucault, who denied animals the participation in power relations is iconically featured in photos holding his feline companion (as cited in Palmer, 2001). Butler (2012), in a lesser known essay written in relation to the work of Alfred North Whitehead, has stretched her own politics at points to assert that the power to provoke a subject-object relation “seem[s] to constitute a kind of agency that is in no way restricted to the human” (p. 8). Our sense of self, it seems, and even our intellectual projects and daily habits, can be dissembled, when confronted by another.

This undoing gives shape to Karl Marx’s (2000) claim that shame is a form of “revolution *in itself*,” (p. 131) capable of resisting dominant social arrangements, and inspiring courage to redefine our common life together. Riffing on Kafka and Marx, Italian philosopher Georgio Agamben suggests shame is the experience of our subjectivity being undone in the gaze of another. We are “desubjectified” in being seen, which can be profoundly unnerving (as cited in Snoek, 2012, p. 91). “In shame,” writes Agamben (1999), “the subject . . . becomes witness to its own disorder; its own oblivion as a subject” (p. 106; as cited in Snoek, 2012, p. 91). In keeping with the dismantling of a phenomenology of presence described above, Agamben (1995) asserts that *we can* *only be subjects in relation to experiences that undo any sense of our own fixed subjectivity,* which can be accomplished through the feeling of shame. We lose ourselves and are simultaneously connected to ourselves—but with a new understanding of subjectivity and all the conflicting relations, actions, and urges that constitute our diffracted self-ness (as cited in Snoek, 2012, p. 91). “Shame, then,” writes Anke Snoek (2012), “is the feeling by which the human being most closely approaches [itself]” (p. 91).

Foer (2010) expands on his own experience of approaching himself at the Berlin aquarium, straining to name the multiple levels of undoing he felt:

The reflection in the tanks wasn’t Kafka’s face. It belonged to a writer who, when held up to his hero, was grossly, shamefully inadequate. And as a Jew in Berlin, I felt other shades of shame. And there was the shame that came with being a tourist, and with being an American as photos of Abu Ghraib proliferated. And there was shame in being human: the shame of knowing that 20 of the roughly 35 classified species of sea horse worldwide are threatened with extinction because they are killed ‘unintentionally’ in seafood production. The shame of indiscriminate killing for no nutritional necessity or political cause or irrational hatred or intractable human conflict. I felt shame in the deaths my culture justified by so thin a concern as the taste of canned tuna (seahorses are one of the more than one hundred sea animal species killed as “by catch” in the modern tuna industry) or the fact that shrimp make convenient hors d’oeuvres (shrimp trawling devastates seahorse populations more than any other activity). I felt shame for living in a nation of unprecedented prosperity—the nation that spends a smaller percentage of income on food than any other civilization has in history—but in the name of affordability treats the animals it eats with cruelty so extreme it would be illegal if inflicted on a dog. (p. 40)

Agamben makes a similar connection when he associates Kafka’s concept of shame with that of Holocaust survivor Primo Levi.

The shame . . . that the just man [sic] experiences at another man’s crime, at the fact that such a crime should exist, that it should have been introduced irrevocably into the world of things that exist and that his will for good should have proved too weak or null and should not have availed in defense. (as cited in Snoek, 2012, p. 92)

This is the place in which shame and resistance meet, in the recognition of what the Greeks called *akrasia*, a weakness of the will to do (or imagine) otherwise in the face of expedient self-serving destruction. Immobilized by such weakness of the will, a feeling of shame may be the only thing that *can be saved* from the wreckage of human activity that has forgotten itself and its ethical responsibilities to the Other. By freeing shame within ourselves, according to Agamben, we unleash new forms of courage and feeling with forgotten life (as cited in Snoek, 2012, p. 93).

In their book, *What is Philosophy?* Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1994) discuss the importance of thinking “before,” or “in front of,” neglected or forgotten life as a way to reckon with the shame of certain aspects of being human. This shame may occur when confronted with extreme situations of violence but also, as they say, in the “insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies . . . the shameful compromises” of values, ideals, market policies, and daily habits that prevent the adequate “becoming” of marginalized life (pp. 107-108;). In his book *Apologia*, for example, Barry Lopez (1998)—aided by Robin Eschner’s evocative woodcut illustrations—describes the daily cost of driving a car. Costs to climate and air quality notwithstanding, Lopez is concerned with the ordinariness of “roadkill” from our vehicles.

A few miles east of home in the Cascades I slow down and pull over for two raccoons, sprawled still as stones in the road. I carry them to the side and lay them in sun-shot, windblown grass in the barrow pit. In eastern Oregon, along U.S. 20, black tailed jackrabbit lie like welts of sod—three, four, then a fifth. By the bridge over Jordan creek, just shy of the Idaho border in the drainage of the Owyhee River, a crumpled adolescent porcupine leers almost maniacally over its blood-flecked teeth. I carry each one away from the tarmac into a cover of grass or brush out of decency, I think. And worry. Who are these animals, their lights gone out? What journeys have fallen apart here? (1998, p. 1)

Lopez’s simple ritual unfolds without priest or text in the passings of his daily life. As Simone Weil suggests, love of our neighbor is not always about grand gestures or policies, but about asking “What are you going through?” and to be attentive to the answer (as cited in Adams, 2006, p. 601). To be able to ask such a question—“What journeys have fallen apart here?”—requires us to see relations beyond our common, current understanding of the political or moral community.

And yet, democracies typically meant to serve the majority usually obscure marginal life (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 108). Democracies, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue, are not intended to serve the “oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and . . . minor” that are marginalized within most political communities (p. 109). People are rarely encouraged to think of the insects underfoot, the food on our plate, the raccoons on the roadside, or even the “enemies,” “aliens,” “criminals,” “mentally ill,” or other “undesirables” (or even “deplorables”) who knock on our mindspaces. To think of these “damned” (Stengers, 2002, p. 238) is “a question of becoming” for the thinker and for the one thought (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 109). Deleuze and Guattari put it this way:

[The thinker] becomes Indian, and never stops becoming so— perhaps ‘so that’ the Indian who is himself Indian become something else and tears himself away from his own agony . . . We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. The agony of a rat or the slaughter of the calf remains present in thought not through pity but as the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into the other . . . becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. (p. 109)

At stake in the experience of shame is the two-fold realization of the Other’s violated or forgotten subjectivity on the one hand, a realization that, on the other hand, undoes our own understanding of ourselves as the only subjects. The two-fold character of exploring another’s vulnerability and becoming vulnerable oneself is also what must prevent speaking and thinking *in front of* a marginal Other from becoming speaking and thinking *on behalf of* a marginal Other, as a kind of appropriation of or paternalism toward the socially marginalized. As Weil suggests above, to inquire into another’s state is an act of invitation from which we can learn and formulate a response; it is not an attempt to represent another’s experience but to actually encounter it. Admittedly, this encounter can be opaque, as when Lopez is contemplating the experience of creatures already dead on the road. And yet, in his questions, “Who are these animals, their lights gone out? What journeys have fallen apart here?” he anticipates a richness of experience—even without answer or observation—that restores a subjectivity to marginal bodies whose experience to that point may have been deemed nonexistent or insignificant.

This two-fold realization of a vulnerable Other that destabilizes our own sense of self is not easy to achieve in a society characterized by what Carol Adams (2006) calls “‘Be a Man’ subjectivity” which “involves a demand to ignore feelings, to distrust the body, and shoulder the responsibility of disengagement,” (p. 598) denying “his (or her) own body and its sensations of unease, concern, sadness, revulsion, etc. to pursue the cultural privilege of treating nonhumans as objects” (p. 598). For Adams, this shift means we move from identifying with the consumer, or the majority, to identifying with the consumed, or the minority—an echo of Deleuze and Guattari’s dual-sided “becoming damned so that the damned may become something else” already mentioned. Further, Adams asserts that “[e]ngaging with the suffering of nonhumans requires, in most cases, acknowledging a suffering the humans themselves are causing” (p. 598).

So how might one begin to craft rituals—secular or religious—that are intended to create discomfort and socially-unacceptable feelings? What is required to think or feel in front of the damned, and is such a question a fool’s errand that by its nature will repel participation? At this early stage, we have four ingredients that we think are essential.

1. Shared vulnerability and undoing the fixed subject

The first ingredient grounds our often involuntary social formation in becoming with individuals and becoming through social systems. Most of these relations are not chosen, yet they constitute our very existence and sense of self. Judith Butler (2005) argues that to “give an account of oneself” is to admit an “unwilled susceptibility” (p. 91) to place, parentage, cultural norms, bacteria in our guts, structural hierarchies—an “unfreedom at the heart of our relations” (p. 91) that undoes any fixed sense of subjectivity and reminds us of the involuntary responsibility and vulnerability in our relations to others.

Responsibility does not emerge from an isolated agent acting on others but is the unchosen condition of a self that is always already given over to relations we cannot choose. We cannot, for example, help but breathe in the “smog” of racism, sexism, and speciesism that permeates our institutional and visual life together (Johnson, 2013, p. 337; Tatum, 2013, p. 65). There is a kind of abundant entanglement, ontological multiplicity, and grief that can emerge in acknowledging the inescapability of being constituted by relations whose life and death we may be incriminated in, even unwittingly.Setting up this entangled multiplicity also grants permission for myriad subjective responses; no hegemony of feeling is required.

2. Naming specific behaviors of fracture and/or their unintended consequences

Already we have looked at the tradition of Jainism with its unusual formality in naming attitudes and basic behaviors in which we value our own purposes and expediency over the lives of others, such as walking without attention, moving objects carelessly, or eating animals. Foer demonstrates how munching on shrimp hors d’oeuvres decimates marine life, including seahorses, starfish, dolphins and sea turtles. The fact that something we desire unintentionally injures something we value can be powerful. In his environmental encyclical, Pope Francis (2015) lists the “fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, and agrotoxins,” that pollute our environment and our habitual life in a “throwaway culture” (p. 7). He incriminates citizens who benefit from an extraction economy that has wrecked biodiversity.

It is not enough, however, to think of different species merely as potential ‘resources’ to be exploited, while overlooking the fact that they have value in themselves. Each year sees the disappearance of thousands of plant and animal species which we will never know, which our children will never see, because they have been lost forever. The great majority become extinct for reasons related to human activity . . . We have no such right. (p. 10)

Even here, perhaps the Pope could be more specific. He could, for example, list one of these species such as the small, forest Kauai O’o bird once found on the Hawaiian Island of Kaua'i, whose song, now preserved at the Macaulay Library of biodiversity media at Cornell, was heard for the last time in 1987, when its extinction was caused by habitat destruction, introduction of non-native species, and the killing of native species (Kauai O’o, n. d., n. p.). Digital resources such as this, or photographic catalogs such as Jo-Anne McArthur’s *WeAnimals.org* online archive offer sensory access to creatures of the past who can yet provoke us toward new modes of feeling.

3. Fostering a two-fold encounter of exposure

The third element requires an attempt to foster a two-fold encounter of exposur**e**—a seeing and being seen—so that when we speak, think, and act, we do so “before the damned” in its particularity. Like Lopez (1998) carrying skunks, sparrows, or a red fox off the road, “like sacks of wet gravel and sand,” one realizes that *this* life is irrevocably gone from our common world, never to return (p. 3). We listen to the sound of the Kauai’O. We think before Whitman’s ox, or Deleuze’s Indian or slaughtered calf, or Kafka’s fish, Foer’s seahorses, or the Jains’ 8.4 million forms of life so that we see the consequences of our latent human-centric ideologies that justify and perform the constant subordination, humiliation, exclusion, torture, and death of plants, animals, systems, and marginalized lives that have not been recognized *as lives*.

4. Salvaging shame, saving ourselves

As Derrida (2001) cautions in his own reflections on mourning, we must not use these deaths or violence for our ends and purposes, whether to put them on display in bad faith or to merely seek expiation or forgiveness that the dead cannot give—or to shore up an egotistical “we” or “me” to cast our pity upon (pp. 6-7). Our words of shame, grief, guilt, or mourning, however ritualized, also come with responsibility, what Derrida calls a “circumfession,” rather than a confession (p. 6). Death and exclusion are not confronted for our advantage but to continue reckoning the real costs of existence and the present boundaries of our political and moral community *so that we may become something else*.

This is the start of overcoming that *akrasia*, or weakness of the will, to do (or imagine) otherwise, by saving shame from the destruction of our overt and implicit violence and systems. By freeing shame within ourselves, we may awaken new modes of courage and feeling with forgotten life and revive that life into re-membership in our communities of co-shaping activity. As Lopez (1998) writes of pulling animals from the road, “Once a man asked, ‘Why do you bother?’ ‘You never know,’ I said. ‘The ones you give some semblance of burial, to whom you offer an apology, may have been like seers in a parallel culture.’ It is an act of respect, a technique of awareness” (p. 3). It may be that seeing, and being seen, before the damned can restore the misfires of memory and bring forth a people, creatures, and earth more intimately acquainted with the infinite provocations of history and the multitudes of the present, toward futures yet to come.

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**Editorial Objectives**

The *Journal for Critical Animal Studies* is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established to foster academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While animal studies is increasingly becoming a field of importance in the academy, much work being done under this moniker takes a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount a more serious critique of underlying issues of political economy and speciesist philosophy. JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy issues. The journal was designed to build up the common activist’s knowledge of animal liberation while at the same time appealing to academic specialists. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints of contributors from the frontlines of activism to academics. We have created the journal to facilitate communication between the many diverse perspectives of the animal liberation movement. Thus, we especially encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing disputing parties and to explore paradigms not currently examined.

**Suggested Topics**

Papers are welcomed in any area of animal liberation philosophy from any discipline, and presenters are encouraged to share theses or dissertation chapters. Since a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytical thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project will be given priority (especially papers that address critical theory, political philosophy, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminism, activism and academia, Continental philosophy, or post-colonial perspectives). We especially encourage contributions that engage animal liberation in disciplines and debates that have received little previous attention.

**Review Process**

Each paper submitted is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication; suitable submissions will be read by at least two members of the journal’s editorial board.

**Manuscript Requirements**

The manuscript should be in MS Word format and follow APA guidelines. All submissions should be double-spaced and in 12 point Times New Roman. Good quality electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. All manuscripts should conform to American spelling.

As a guide, we ask that regular essays and reviews be between 2000-8000 words and have limited endnotes. In exceptional circumstances, JCAS will consider publishing extended essays. Authors should supply a brief abstract of the paper (of no more than 250 words). A brief autobiographical note should be supplied which includes full names, affiliation, email address, and full contact details.

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2. Isaac Willis is an undergraduate student at Monmouth College studying philosophy and literature. He is the coordinating editor of the *Midwest Journal of Undergraduate Research*. In 2017, he received the Sam Thompson essay award in the humanities and the Rosanna Webster Graham award in creative writing. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A full version of *English Pratikramana*, distributed by the Federation of Jains in North America (JAINA), and used throughout U.S. Jain temples is available at [http://www.jainlibrary.org/elib\_master/jaina\_edu/jaina\_edu\_book/$JES931\_English\_Pratikramana\_Color\_E5\_000241\_data.pdf](http://www.jainlibrary.org/elib_master/jaina_edu/jaina_edu_book/%24JES931_English_Pratikramana_Color_E5_000241_data.pdf). See also Jaini (2010, pp. 17-18) as well as Williams (1963, p. 207). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)